

Reflections on the Craig–Flew Debate

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Changing Intellectual Climate

In a foreword to a recent book on the philosophy of religion, Professor William Abraham comments that when he arrived in Oxford as a graduate student in 1973 he little knew that he was ‘at the beginning of a golden period in the philosophy of religion’ in which believers could ‘take a lead and create the intellectual space in which Christian belief could be taken seriously once again. The outcome over the last forty years, as seen in the wealth of material that has been published has been startling in its originality and depth.’¹ The book for which this foreword was written is *The Agnostic Inquirer* by Sandra Menssen and Thomas Sullivan, two former agnostic professors of philosophy who have gradually reasoned their way to a rational faith. They wrote this book to help fellow agnostic inquirers follow them to their new convictions. They show in a work of outstanding logical force that a cumulative rational case for God’s existence can be carefully developed in which natural theology and revelation combine to mutually support each other as components of a reasonable faith in a creator God who has willed to become known to humankind.

William Abraham’s assessment of the emergence of a newly confident Christian philosophy in the last 40 years is confirmed by the Canadian atheist

philosopher Kai Nielsen. Writing in 1971 Nielsen said that philosophers who took the claims of religion seriously were 'very much in the minority and their arguments have been forcefully contested'. But nearly 20 years later Nielsen's estimate of philosophical attitudes was quite different:

Philosophy of religion in Anglo-American context has taken a curious turn in the past decade . . . what has come to the forefront . . . is a group of Christian philosophers of a philosophically analytic persuasion, but hostile to even the residues of logical empiricism or Wittgensteinianism, who return to the old topics and the old theses of traditional Christian philosophy and natural theology.²

We need to notice that Nielsen describes this development as 'curious', indicating that he himself remains unconvinced. None the less it is intriguing that Richard Purtill similarly says of contemporary debate: 'All the traditional arguments have able and respected defenders, and if there is not a consensus in favour of philosophical arguments for God's existence it is no longer true that there is a consensus against.'³

The clearest indication of just how much the intellectual climate has changed may be gauged by comparing the 1948 debate on the existence of God between Bertrand Russell and the Jesuit Philosopher Frederick Copleston with the 1998 commemoration of that encounter by a return match between William Lane Craig, author of *The Kalam Cosmological Argument* and Antony Flew, who

was probably the best known philosophical atheist of the second half of the 20th century just as Bertrand Russell was of the first half. The transcript of the latter debate was edited by Stan Wallace as *Does God Exist?* This book contains reflective comments from eight other leading philosophers of religion both atheist and believers together with final thoughts about the debate from both Craig and Flew.

Intelligent Design

The first thing that stands out about the new debate is how much the ground has shifted in favour of belief in a first cause and an intelligent designer. In the debate between Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston, it was clear that Copleston could find no effective argument against Bertrand Russell. Russell clearly won. By contrast looking back over the Craig–Flew debate the philosopher who chaired it, Keith Yandell believed that ‘what consensus there is about the matter suggests that Craig won the debate’.⁴ Indeed William Rowe thinks that Flew was forced ‘to give up so much ground’ as ‘virtually to concede the debate’.⁵

The essential difference between the Russell–Copleston debate and the Craig–Flew debate is the shift in scientific opinion about the nature of the Universe which has occurred in the intervening years. Bertrand Russell lived at a time when scientists assumed that the universe was eternal and hence uncaused. Consequently when Copleston tried to argue for the universe being

created, Russell could just sit back, fold his arms and declare, 'the Universe is just there, and that's all.'⁶ Similarly at the first debate the whole idea of divine design was held to be long since demolished by Darwinian evolution.

Now however the situation is totally different because the consensus of contemporary science is that the universe has not always existed. It came into being from nothing between twelve and fifteen billion years ago. Moreover scientists also believe that the initial conditions of the universe immediately after the 'Big Bang' appears to be 'finely tuned' for the emergence of life and mind. This looks like design. Craig is the philosopher who has done most to spell out the religious implications of this scientific consensus and he does this very succinctly in this debate.

The coming into being of the universe from nothing changes the character of the cosmological argument. Craig shows this by developing the Islamic version of the Cosmological argument known as the Kalam Cosmological argument. It goes like this:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The Universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the Universe has a cause.

The point Craig is making is that we don't normally seek explanations for things that we are used to, but when something wholly new happens that we do

ask what brought it about. So whereas when it was thought the universe had always existed there was no need to look for an explanation of it, now that we know it began from nothing there is a need to explain why it came into being. And if the whole of reality came into being at that point then any explanation for the universe has to be transcendent to the universe.

As Craig puts it

from the nature of the case, as the cause of space and time, this cause must be an uncaused, timeless, changeless, and immaterial being of unimaginable power.

The only way for the cause to be timeless and for the effect to begin to exist in time is for the cause to be a personal agent who freely chooses to create an effect in time without any prior determining conditions. Thus we are brought, not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe but to its personal creator.⁷

The alternative to belief in a Creator God is to suppose that the universe simply came into being uncaused. As Anthony Kenny puts it, 'A proponent of the (Big Bang) theory, at least if he is an atheist must believe that . . . the universe came from nothing and by nothing'.⁸ Craig then asks what makes more sense; to believe that the universe was created, or that it 'just "popped into being" out of nothing, uncaused'?⁹

Fine-tuning of the Universe

Craig's second argument is even stronger and that is the argument based on the 'fine-tuning' of the universe. He expresses the argument thus:

The existence of intelligent life depends on a delicate and complex balance of initial conditions simply given in the Big Bang itself. We now know that life-prohibiting universes are vastly more probable than life permitting universes . . . for example Stephen Hawking has calculated that if the rate of the universe's expansion one second after the big bang had been smaller by even one part in a hundred thousand million million, the universe would have re-collapsed into a hot fire-ball.¹⁰

Paul Davies has calculated that the odds against the initial conditions being suitable for star formation (without which planets could not exist) is one followed by a thousand billion billion zeros at least.¹¹ There are around 50 such quantities and constants present in the Big Bang which must be fine-tuned in this way if the universe is to permit life. And it's not just each quantity which must be finely tuned. Their ratio to one another must also be exquisitely fine-tuned. So improbability is multiplied by improbability, until our minds are reeling with incomprehensible numbers. There is no physical reason why these constants and quantities possess the values they do.

Craig sums up his argument thus:

1. The fine-tuning of the initial conditions of the universe must be due to either law, chance or design.
2. It is not due to either law or chance.
3. Therefore it is due to design.

This conclusion has been challenged by the many-world quantum theory of H. Everett. Everett accepts that the odds against a life-supporting universe are astronomically high but argues that if there were an infinite number of universes one would expect one of them to have emerged in the ways ours has done.¹² The problem with this is, as Paul Davies points out is that the odds of one against an infinite number being realised is zero so that that argument collapses.¹³ It is also the case that we have absolutely no empirical evidence for the existence of an infinite number of universes. In the absence of such evidence we should, Craig argues, employ Ockham's razor and accept that 'it is simpler to postulate one cosmic designer to explain our universe than to postulate the infinitely bloated and contrived ontology of the many worlds hypothesis'.¹⁴

This argument for the fine-tuning of the universe is described by Robert Jastrow, Head of NASA's Institute for State Studies as 'the most powerful evidence for the existence of God ever to come out of science'. Terry Miethe notes that as a result of the evidence of fine-tuning, 'The argument from design has very recently gained acceptance among many scientists.'¹⁵ Keith Ward

comments that 'Just when philosophers had thought that the argument from design was gone for ever, the physicist brings it back again'.¹⁶

Antony Flew recognised that these new developments in the natural sciences do affect the arguments for the existence of God and as an atheist he was not happy about these developments. But he recognised that one cannot simply opt to ignore this new data. In the question session after the debate he was asked why he didn't adopt the model of a cyclical universe since that 'might fit better into an argument against God'. Flew totally agreed that it would indeed be much better for the atheist position if one could go back to a steady state universe. 'If it was a matter of my preference, I would certainly prefer a cyclical universe exploding and contracting and so on.' But apparently 'this idea has been empirically ruled out' so 'the discussion here tonight had to start from what is clearly the main accepted view among cosmologists'.¹⁷

It is interesting to note that Fred Hoyle former Professor of Astronomy at Cambridge and for many years a prominent champion both of the steady state universe and of a militant atheism felt a similar exasperation with the new findings. As Hoyle says

A commonsense interpretation of the facts suggests that a super intellect has monkeyed with physics, as well as with chemistry and biology, and there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature.

The numbers one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming as to put this conclusion almost beyond question.¹⁸

However Flew is more robust than Hoyle. He accepts that Craig's Kalam argument is a good argument but goes on to say 'but this is supposed to be an argument for a bodiless person . . . who was himself uncreated and eternal'. Flew believes that the notion of an incorporeal person doesn't make sense, and hence one cannot have evidence for it. He also insists that we simply do not know enough to answer the question what caused the universe to come into being because all our knowledge about causation refers to causation '*within* the universe and it is *wholly* arbitrary and prejudicial to think' that therefore 'the universe must have had a cause'. We have to stop somewhere in our search for explanation and the big bang is the place where we should stop.¹⁹

It is clear that Flew recognises a difficulty in simply asserting that the universe just began without a cause. He pleads with the audience to 'at least entertain the possibility that it's not ridiculous for the universe to pop into existence out of nothing.'²⁰ But in saying this Flew recognises that it must seem ridiculous to speak in this way. As a Hume specialist Flew will have been well aware of the views of his master on the principle of causality. In his letters Hume makes absolutely clear that his academic denial of the principle's demonstrability could not eradicate his belief that it was none the less true.²¹ What David Hume actually wrote was:

Allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a proposition as *that anything might arise without a cause*: I only maintained that our Certainty of the Falsehood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source.²²

All that Hume had intended to show was that the principle of causation was not analytic, and therefore it was *logically* possible that it *might* not always apply. However all our experience teaches us that in real life the principle of causation in fact *always does apply*.

Craig develops this argument: 'Constantly verified and never falsified, the causal proposition may be taken as an empirical generalisation enjoying the strongest support experience affords.'²³ I agree with Keith Yandell's comment that in arguing that the causal principle applied only within the universe and not to the universe itself Flew was taking a totally arbitrary position. I accept it isn't provable, but it seems to me more reasonable to say that if causation applies to everything within the universe it ought to apply to the universe also. Since David Hume believed it was an absurd proposition to imagine that anything might arise without a cause it would seem bizarre to think that the coming into being of the universe out of nothing should happen without a cause. (This issue did not arise in Hume's day because he and his contemporaries took for granted that philosophically the universe had always existed).

In his final reflection on the debate Flew accepted that the new arguments are strong but he did not think they provided sufficiently good evidential reasons for coming to believe in God. However he did think at the time that they do provide evidencing reasons for maintaining a belief in God which someone already holds. As he puts it, if a cradle Roman Catholic believes that the universe has a beginning and will have an end then 'acceptance of the Big Bang surely does provide empirical confirmation of the first part of that belief'. Likewise if a person believes in a purposeful creation then 'it is entirely reasonable to welcome the fine-tuning argument as providing confirmation of that belief.'²⁴

Flew's Final Reflections

Almost six years, after the debate Flew went further and announced in January 2004 that he had come to believe in God. He 'simply had to go where the evidence leads' and it now seemed to him that the case for God 'is now much stronger than it ever was before'. He stressed that he had not become a Christian because many areas of Christian believing remained abhorrent to him. However in regard to a Creator God he was now convinced by the new scientific arguments associated with big bang cosmology and the fine tuning of the universe. He noted that Bertrand Russell had always rejected belief in God because of the lack of evidence but in Flew's view there now was evidence 'and I think we can be sure that Russell would have been impressed. . . . This would have produced an interesting second dialogue between him and the distinguished Catholic philosopher Frederick Copleston'.²⁵

It seems to me that if the Craig–Flew debate has been limited in the way the Russell–Copleston debate was to the cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God then Craig would clearly have ‘won’, as indeed, six years on, Flew conceded. Unfortunately from the perspective of a rational liberal theology their discussion widened into an analysis of the pros and cons of fundamentalist doctrines which Craig sought to defend. Although Craig is a very able philosopher he is also a very traditional Christian who embraces absolutist moral standards, thinks the resurrection of Jesus must be understood literally, and believes that people of other faiths have no knowledge of God and are consequently destined for damnation in hell.

Not surprisingly much of the discussion both in the debate and even more so in the book focused on these arguments. Consequently Flew focused most of his cannon against Craig’s evangelical beliefs. In particular Flew focused on the fact that Craig is a Christian exclusivist who believes that ‘if we take scripture seriously, we must admit that the vast majority of persons in the world are condemned and will be forever lost’.²⁶ Flew showed by extensive quotation that in holding such views Craig was in agreement with St Paul, St Thomas Aquinas, Luther and Calvin and indeed with the vast majority of Christian opinion before the modern period.

It is clear that the real force behind Flew's reluctance to accept Craig's careful arguments for the existence of God was his sense of outrage about the qualities of the God in whom Craig believes. I fully understand the exasperation felt by Flew in his final reflection on the debate.

How I wish it were possible to decisively to disprove the claim that the Universe was created by the God of Calvin and Luther, of St Thomas Aquinas and St Paul. What I was trying to reveal in the debate was not that God doesn't exist but, rather, how infinitely terrible are the implications if he does.²⁷

What Sort of God do Contemporary Christians Believe in?

Reflecting on this debate has made me realise that in many areas of Christian beliefs liberal Christians share Flew's atheism in relation to the God in whom Craig believes.

However this realisation throws light on a paradox in the contemporary debate about God. This paradox is that the strongest arguments for the existence of God are derived from the findings of contemporary astronomy, but research into the religious beliefs of American astronomers show that only 22 per cent of them are prepared to affirm belief in God.²⁸ This is even true of many of the astronomers who write about the Big Bang and the fine-tuning of the universe. For example Stephen Hawking normally calls himself an atheist even

though he believes that you can define God as the answer to the question ‘why does the universe bother to exist?’²⁹ When asked on the television programme *The Big Question* ‘what preceded the Big Bang’ his answer was unequivocal – ‘For me the most attractive idea is that the Universe was spontaneously created out of absolutely nothing.’³⁰ It seems to me that the underlying problem is that many Christians believe so many appalling things about God that scientists and philosophers who are actually sympathetic to the cosmological and teleological arguments for God’s existence don’t want to be associated with talk about God. This would be especially true in the light of the revival of ‘creationism’ in the deep south of the United States in which belief in a divine creator is associated with belief in the literal truth of the Genesis story, and belief in a divine designer is associated with a denial of evolution. Such reactionary approaches make it difficult for people to be seen to endorse the very different modern ideas of creation through evolution which derive from belief in Big Bang cosmology and the fine-tuning of the universe.

According to Fred Hoyle, ‘While most scientists eschew religion it actually dominates their thoughts more than it does the clergy’.³¹ Stephen Hawking may help to explain the paradox when he affirms ‘belief in a mathematical God, . . . but not in what people normally mean by “God”’.³² John Leslie is even more illuminating. He fully accepts that ‘our universe does look . . . very much as if designed by God’ but suggests that this God might be much closer to the concept of God found in Neo-platonism rather than the God of popular Christianity ‘who

designs the structures of individual organisms, plague germs perhaps, or who intervenes with nature's day to day operations'.³³

Even the militantly atheist Richard Dawkins acknowledges that:

There are possible good reasons for believing in some sort of grand supernatural intelligence. They are never anything to do with the biblical God, which is just an ancient bronze age belief having no semblance of reality. But there are modern physicists who believe that the universe-if you actually look at the laws of the universe, they are to some physicists too good to be true. This suggests a very interesting case for a possible very, very deep reason why we might believe in some sort of grand fundamental intelligence underlying the universe.'³⁴

Dawkins goes to stress that this 'grand supernatural intelligence' has nothing whatever to do with 'the kind of God that people go into a church to worship, pray to, fear, ask forgiveness from . . . the sort of God who cares about your sex life . . . '.

The tragedy of the current situation in our church is that in so many respects Dawkins is right. Although the most basic Christian belief of all is in a Creative Mind (*logos*) underlying all reality, we often behave as if what we really believe in is a bronze age deity imposing taboos on people's sexual preferences and concerned to deny the full equality of women with men. That is the picture

the Anglican Church has given to the world in its most vocal debates between the two Lambeth conferences. The reason I talk of tragedy is that this is all happening at a time when even Dawkins says 'very very deep reasons' can be given for belief in a cosmic intelligence, and when serious philosophy and science suggests that the most truly fundamental beliefs of our religion might actually correspond with reality.

What this whole debate makes clear is that if one is going to argue for the rationality of belief in God today one has not only to show that there are good reasons for believing in God, but also to show that believing in God need not entail belief in either the trivial or the terrible things, that have been proclaimed about this God or that have been done in God's name.

Do Christians Believe in the Existence of Hell?

When discussing his views about the nature of morality Craig argues that we know on the basis of God's authority that love is really good and cruelty is always wrong. Given this, Craig is simply inconsistent in affirming the existence of hell. Craig himself greatly dislikes the concept of hell; 'no orthodox Christian likes the doctrine of hell or delights in anyone's condemnation. I truly wish that universalism was true, but it is not.'³⁵ Clearly the doctrine of hell offends Craig's moral sense. But if it really does offend his moral sense then on his own argument about the divinely given character of the sense of right and wrong which impose themselves upon our conscience he should reject hell. Flew notes

that Craig's two beliefs are mutually incompatible, and he quotes with approval the Church of England Doctrine report of 1995 which declared 'It is incompatible with the essential Christian affirmation that God is love to say that God brings millions into the world to damn them.'³⁶

What I would suggest in relation to this aspect of the Craig–Flew debate is that Craig should bring his beliefs about morality up to the same level of coherence as his beliefs about philosophy. I also suggest that Flew should not insist that the Christian understanding of God must necessarily be associated with beliefs about hell and predestination which virtually all contemporary Christians have discarded. Pope John-Paul II affirmed in his first encyclical letter that 'every human being without any exception whatever has been redeemed by Christ'.³⁷ Flew himself notes that though he was the son of a famous Methodist theologian and attended a Methodist boarding school, none of his ministerial relatives and friends ever feared that he would go to hell for his unbelief. Flew also knows that though he taught in Aberdeen he never met anyone in the formerly Calvinist Church of Scotland who still held to predestination. The same is true of the Welsh denomination formerly known as the Calvinistic Methodists. Having abandoned Calvinism they now call themselves Presbyterians. It is true that believers in God have believed and done all manner of awful things as indeed have some 20th century atheists like Stalin and Mao. But such things should be irrelevant to the philosophical question of God existence.

Looking back over the debate as a whole I think that all the participants are right to see the new versions of the cosmological and design argument as much stronger than the old ones, whether or not they are convinced by them. I also think it a pity that so much of contemporary Christianity presents an understanding of God which is incompatible with a scientific understanding of reality. The Craig–Flew debate would have been better if it had focused on the two creative arguments with which Craig opened the discussion. Much of the space in this book is wasted on whether or not Christian doctrine entails an acceptance of hell or predestination. Among Christian intellectuals, predestination and hell were abandoned more than a hundred years ago. The acquittal of my predecessor Rowland Williams in the last heresy trial of a British academic in 1864 should have marked the end of such ideas and within 40 years it pretty well had. Likewise virtually all clergy had accepted the truth of Darwin’s theory of evolution by the time of Darwin’s death in 1884. It was important that the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and the Bishop of London were on his memorial committee and that Darwin was buried in Westminster Abbey. It was also important that since 1898 the Modern Churchpeople’s Union has been campaigning for an understanding of God which is compatible with all the findings of modern science. The Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Fine-tuning of the Universe suggests that theism might indeed correspond to reality. I share the view of one of Craig’s atheist critics, Paul Draper that Craig is an excellent philosopher whose project of using philosophical argumentation to establish Christian theism, or theism, or even the existence of a Copleston-god is

still a work in progress and it is to this that Craig should devote his considerable talent.³⁸

Notes

- ¹ Sandra Menssen and Thomas Sullivan, *The Agnostic Inquirer* (Michigan: Eerdmans, 2007) p. xi.
- ² Kai Nielsen, *Contemporary Critiques of Religion* (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 19 and 'Foreword' to K. Parsons, *God and the Burden of Proof* (New York: Prometheus, 1989), p. 7.
- ³ Richard Purtill, 'The Current State of Arguments for the Existence of God', *Review and Expositor* Vol. 82.
- ⁴ Keith Yandell, 'Some issues in atheism and theism: setting the context' in Stan Wallace, *Does God Exist: the Craig–Flew Debate* (London: Ashgate, 2003), p. 14.
- ⁵ William Rowe, 'Reflections on the Craig–Flew debate', *ibid*, pp. 70-71.
- ⁶ Bertrand Russell and F.C. Copleston, 'A Debate on the Existence of God' in John Hick (ed) *The Existence of God* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 175.
- ⁷ W. Craig, 'The Craig–Flew debate' in Wallace, *op.cit* p. 20.
- ⁸ A. Kenny, *The Five Ways: St Thomas Aquinas Proofs of God's Existence* (New York, Schocken, 1969), p. 66, cited by Craig, p. 20.
- ⁹ W. Craig, 'The Craig–Flew debate' in Wallace, *op.cit*, p. 20.
- ¹⁰ Stephen Hawking, *A Brief History of Time* (New York: Bantam, 1988), p. 123 cited in Craig *idem*.
- ¹¹ Paul Davies, *Other Worlds* (London: Dent, 1980), pp. 160-61, cited in Craig *op.cit*. p.21.
- ¹² W.L. Craig, 'The teleological argument and the anthropic principle' in W.L. Craig and M.S. Mcleod (eds), *The Logic of Rational Theism* (New York: Mellen, 1990), pp. 142-3.
- ¹³ Paul Davies, *The Mind of God* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 104-5.
- ¹⁴ W.Craig, 'A reply to Objections' in Wallace *op.cit* p.166
- ¹⁵ Terry Miethe and Antony Flew, *Does God Exist?: A Believer and an Atheist Debate* (New York: Harper, 1991), p. 65.
- ¹⁶ Keith Ward, *The Turn of the Tide: Christian Belief in Britain Today* (London: BBC Publications, 1986), p. 45.
- ¹⁷ Keith Ward, *The Turn of the Tide*; p. 41.
- ¹⁸ Cited in Timothy Ferris, *The Whole Shebang* (London : Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1997), p. 305.
- ¹⁹ Antony Flew, 'The Craig–Flew Debate' in Wallace *op.cit*. pp. 26, 31.
- ²⁰ Antony Flew, 'The Craig–Flew Debate' in Wallace *op.cit*. p.25.
- ²¹ William Craig in *Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology*, p. 57.

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- ²² *The Letters of David Hume* ed. J.Y.T. Greig, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1932 Vol.1), p. 187, cited in Craig, p. 57.
- ²³ William Craig, *Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology*, p. 61.
- ²⁴ Antony Flew, 'The Craig–Flew Debate' in Wallace op.cit. p.190.
- ²⁵ Antony Flew, 'My pilgrimage from Atheism to Theism, <http://www.biola.edu/antonyflew/flew-interview.pdf>, also see *Philosophia Christi Winter 2005*.
- ²⁶ Antony Flew, 'The Craig–Flew Debate' in Wallace op.cit. p.26.
- ²⁷ Flew, 'A reply to my critics' *ibid.* p. 204.
- ²⁸ C. Mackenzie Brown, 'The conflict between Religion and Science in Light of the Patterns of Religious Belief among Scientists' *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science* Vol.38 No.3 (September 2003).
- ²⁹ Stephen Hawking, *Black Holes and Baby Universes* (London: Bantam, 1993), p. 63.
- ³⁰ *The Times* 6 January 2004 section 2 p. 24.
- ³¹ Cited in Paul Davies, *The Mind of God* (London: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 223.
- ³² Video *Whose World?* edited by Adam Ford, CTVC, 1987.
- ³³ John Leslie, *Universes* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 22, 2, 167.
- ³⁴ BBC talk given March 16, 2003, retrieved 28 August 2004 from www.bbc.co.uk/northernireland/religion/sundaysequence/archive-interviews.shtml cited in Menssen and Sullivan, *The Agnostic Inquirer*, p. 117.
- ³⁵ Antony Flew, 'The Craig–Flew Debate in Wallace op.cit, p.26 citing Craig, 'The Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ', *Faith and Philosophy* 6 (1989), p. 166.
- ³⁶ Church of England Doctrine Commission, *The Mystery of Salvation* (London: Church House Publishing, 1995), p. 180 cited by Flew p. 198.
- ³⁷ Pope John-Paul II, *Redemptor Hominis* (Rome: Encyclical Letter), para. 14.
- ³⁸ Paul Draper, 'Craig's case for God's existence' in Wallace op.cit. p.153.

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